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International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice
in International Investment Law and Arbitration
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN*
ABSTRACT
Judicial administration ofjustice through reasoned interpretation, application and
clarification of legal principles and rules is among the oldest paradigms of constitutional
justice. The principles of procedural justice underlying investor-state arbitration remain
controversial, especially if confidentiality and party autonomy governing commercial ar-
bitration risk neglecting adversely affected third parties and public interests. There are also
concerns that rule-following andformal equality offoreign investors and home states may
not ensure substantive justice in the settlement of investment disputes unless arbitrators and
courts take more seriously their customary law obligation ofsettling disputes in conformity
with human rights obligations of governments and other principles ofjustice calling for
judicial balancing of all private and public interests affected by the dispute. The constitu-
tional task ofjudges to apply the law and settle disputes in conformity with principles of
justice may require reviewing whether judicial reasoning remains compatible with redis-
tributive principles of case-specific equity, social justice and corrective justice.
INTRODUCTION
This article begins by explaining, in Part I, that the emergence of rule of law
in international trade and investments is due to multilevel constitutional restraints
on abuses of power and multilevel judicial protection of constitutional justice,
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such as in the review and recognition of foreign arbitral awards and court judg-
ments, international annulment proceedings, and appellate review of dispute set-
tlement rulings. Part II argues that the variety of alternative dispute settlement
fora for international investment disputes-like private commercial arbitration,
national courts, investor-state arbitration based on bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) or regional agreements (like Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)), regional economic or human rights courts, worldwide
courts (like the International Court of Justice (ICJ)), and alternative dispute settle-
ment bodies (such as in the World Trade Organization(WTO))-should admin-
ister justice in more consistent ways. Additionally, they should reduce the risks of
legal and jurisdictional fragmentation in international law by reviewing their tex-
tual, contextual, and teleological interpretations of international treaties from the
constitutional perspective of the judicial task of settling disputes in conformity
with principles of justice and the universal human rights obligations of govern-
ments. Part III explores why national and international courts, investor-state arbi-
tral tribunals, and alternative fora for the settlement of transnational investment
disputes and other economic disputes, in their judicial review of treaty claims and
related contract claims (such as those regarding alleged government interferences
into property rights), refer so rarely to the customary law requirement of settling
disputes concerning treaties in conformity with the principles of justice and inter-
national law codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention).' Part IV explains why constitutional justice is also an appropriate
paradigm for commercial investor-state arbitration. Part V concludes that rule of
law in international investment law and arbitration requires multilevel judicial
cooperation and more comprehensive judicial balancing of private rights and cor-
responding constitutional obligations of governments.
I. INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW REQUIRES RESPECT FOR THE REALITY OF
MULTILEVEL CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM
Public international law has historically evolved as a decentralized, legal, and
coercive order (that is, in the sense of Hans Kelsen's unified conception of national
and international law as deriving from the same basic Grundnorm)2 and power-
I. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, pmbl., May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [herein-
after Vienna Convention].
2. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 325 (1945); see also HANS KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 417-18 (1952) (formulating the basic customary norm of the
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oriented legal system (like H.L.A. Hart's "concept of law," which consists of pri-
mary rules of conduct and secondary rules concerning the recognition,
amendment, and enforcement of rules).3 While the reality of international law, in
the sense of the actual invocation, application, and enforcement of rules described
as law by governments and courts, has existed for centuries, the authoritative de-
cision-making processes constituting international law (as described by the Yale
School founded by Myres McDougal and W. Michael Reisman) are ever more
shaped by domestic constitutional systems committed to the protection of human
rights. Even though "the need for universal adherence to and implementation of
the rule of law at both the national and international levels" is recognized in a few
U.N. resolutions,4 neither the U.N. Charter nor other U.N. treaties constitute an
effective rule of law system' as a constitutional restraint on the rule of men and
their rule by law.6 In the U.N. Charter, all 192 U.N. member states have reaf-
firmed-on behalf of "We the peoples of the United Nations"-their "faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small" so as "to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from trea-
ties and other sources of international law can be maintained."7 Yet, as long as
U.N. human rights conventions do not provide for effective judicial remedies and
only about one-third of U.N. member states have submitted to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ and other worldwide courts (such as the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea), the U.N. objective "to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, ad-
justment, or settlement of international disputes"8 is not effectively secured.
Hence, most constitutional democracies (including the United States) take the re-
national and international legal order as follows: "The states ought to behave as they have custom-
arily behaved," allowing revolution and the principle of effectiveness to be law-creating facts).
3. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
4. E.g., G.A. Res. 60/1, 134, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/l (Oct. 24 , 2005) (U.N. member states also
"reaffirm our commitment.., to an international order based on the rule of law and international
law, which is essential for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among States.").
5. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 88 (Stephen Everson ed., 2d
ed. 1996) (discussing the ancient legal ideal of "rule of law," and its dialectic development on the basis
of constitutional rights and principles of justice restraining the instrumental "governance by law").
6. See IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 214 (1998).
7. U.N. Charter pmbl.
8. Id. art. 1, 1.
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alistic view that governments should aim at "international rule of law" and sub-
mit to the rule of international law only as long as these rules remain consistent
with the constitutional guarantees of human rights, democracy, and justice in
domestic jurisdictions. ° Due to the diversity of domestic constitutional traditions,
democratic preferences, and international bargaining power among states, na-
tional conceptions of international rule of law continue to differ fundamentally
among the 192 U.N. member states.
The United States, for example, notwithstanding its hegemonic leadership of
multilateral agreements and institutions (such as the United Nations and the Bret-
ton Woods institutions) and its promotion of democratic constitutionalism through-
out Europe and the world following World Wars I and II, justifies its long tradition
of unilateralism and exceptionalism in its international legal relations on democratic
and hegemonic grounds (such as congressional insistence on veto rights in the U.N.
Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank; non-rat-
ification by Congress of most U.N. human rights conventions and International
Labor Organization conventions; U.S. withdrawal from the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the ICJ; and U.S. non-adherence to many other international courts like the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights)." Yet, national law and international law
depend on each other for the collective supply of international public goods, like in-
ternational rule of law. International law cannot be effective without its good faith
implementation inside domestic legal systems, in the same way that domestic legal
systems cannot remain effective in a globally interdependent world without the in-
ternational legal coordination of their often adverse external effects on other polities
and legal systems. American international lawyers focusing on state interests, as de-
fined by the state's political leadership, openly admit that their power-oriented inter-
national law approaches are "not necessarily, or even usually, the policy that would
maximize the public good within the state" or collective "international public
goods" among states. 2 In light of the "democratic process pathologies such as inter-
est group capture" and "collective action problems in performing cosmopolitan du-
9. See, e.g., G. JOHN IKENBERRY & ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, FORGING A WORLD OF LIBERTY UNDER
LAW: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2006).
10. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Jus-
tice, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 769, 780 (2008).
11. See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005) (dis-
cussing U.S. exceptionalism in the realm of human rights); Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, in
EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 233,233-46 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005) (discussing contempo-
rary U.S. unilateralism).
12. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 87 (2005).
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ties," the "absence of democratic support" for the collective supply of international
public goods is viewed as "an inherent feature of democratic process" and an insur-
mountable "hurdle to cosmopolitan action." 3 Imbalances in power and informa-
tion-sharing, as well as the absence of a centralized enforcement mechanism, "make
international collective action problems difficult to overcome even when there is a
plausible argument that the international regime, if successful, would enhance the
welfare of every participating state."'4
Such justifications of American nationalism, however, remain unconvincing in
view of the effective supply of international public goods through European integra-
tion law since the 1960s, coupled with the increasing globalization of human rights,
constitutionalism and market integration, as well as market regulation, since the fall
of the Berlin Wall in 1989. European lawyers and courts increasingly focus on com-
mon constitutional principles and on multilevel parliamentary, governmental, and
judicial cooperation for limiting governance failures at national levels, according
due respect to the reality of constitutional pluralism in diverse national and interna-
tional legal regimes. In its September 3, 2008, decision in Kadi v. Council of Euro-
pean Union, for example, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that U.N.
Security Council sanctions against alleged terrorists can be implemented inside the
European Community (EC) only in conformity with European constitutional
guarantees of judicial remedy and fundamental rights (such as the right to be heard,
the right to effective judicial protection, and respect for private property). Rather
than relying on formal monist claims of the supremacy of international law based
on U.N. Charter Article 103, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, or dualist claims
of the legal autonomy of EC law, the ECJ reconciled the general rule that "the Eu-
ropean Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers"
with the constitutional prohibition of EC measures violating European human
rights by means of substantive judicial review leading to the judicial annulment of
the EC implementing regulation.5 U.N. human rights law confirms that, in the
absence of adequate guarantees of human rights and judicial review at the U.N.
level, U.N. member states and European courts must remain entitled to comply
13. Id. at 206-17.
14. Id.
15. Joined Cases C-402/05P & C-415/05P, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, 2008 O.J.
(C285) 2,41 C.M.L.R. 1207,1240 (Aug. 11); see THE EUROPEANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jan
Wouters et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the status of international law in the EU and its member
states); see also RELOCATINC THE RULE OF LAW (Gianluggi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009)
(discussing the EC as a "community of law" based on "rule of law," the conceptual independence
of rule of law from democracy and its content-dependent, constitutional assessment).
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with their human rights obligations and to protect judicial remedies at national and
European levels. The rule of law, therefore, may legitimately differ in domestic and
international jurisdictions depending on their often diverse constitutional and inter-
national legal obligations and the democratic and judicial conceptions of the rule of
law prevailing in that jurisdiction. This was illustrated by the 2006 U.S. Supreme
Court judgment in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 6
It is only in the field of international trade and inestment law that the United
States has supported initiatives for multilevel judicial protection of international
rule of law. Today such protection is an integral part of more than 2,500 BITs,
regional trade and investment agreements (such NAFTA), the law of the WTO,
and other agreements on international judicial cooperation and international ju-
dicial remedies. In European economic law, the treaties establishing the EC, the
European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA), and the ever-in-
creasing number of EC free trade agreements with third-party countries in Eu-
rope and beyond are all based on common constitutional "principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of
law,'' 7 justifying their provision of effective legal and judicial safeguards not only
for the sovereign rights of states, but also for the individual rights of their citizens.
Just as U.N. human rights conventions explicitly recognize "that these rights de-
rive from the inherent dignity of the human person,"" so too does the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights ground the human rights approach to European eco-
nomic law, and the rights-based conception of the EC's international market free-
doms, as fundamental freedoms of individuals to be protected by national and
European courts. 9 The multilevel, constitutional, and judicial protection of rule
of law and of democratic citizen rights in the European common market law of
the thirty EEA member states refutes the prevailing North American view that
16. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592-635 (2006), where the Supreme Court defined
the rule of law "in this jurisdiction" in conformity with the judicially enforceable Geneva Conven-
tions on the law of war and Article 21 of the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice.
17. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6, Dec. 29, 2006 O.J. (321E) 1,
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/20000222/libe/art6/defaulten.htm.
18. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, G.A. 2200A(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/
b/acescr.htm.
19. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pmbl., Dec. 18, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
(acknowledging "the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidar-
ity" and "the principles of democracy and the rule of law"); see Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon
and Fundamental Rights, in THE LISBON TREATY: EU CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHOUT A CONSTITU-
TIONAL TREATY? 235 (Stefan Griller & Jacques Ziller eds., 2008).
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rule of law and democracy can be effective only inside nation-states.2" Constitu-
tional nationalism and power-oriented foreign policies fail to acknowledge that
the collective supply of international public goods depends on multilevel judicial
protection of international rule of law, which is universally recognized in the cus-
tomary law requirement of settling "disputes concerning treaties, like other inter-
national disputes,... in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law," including "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all."'"
II. THE NEED TO CLARIFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ADJUDICATION
Are "principles of justice" the relevant context for the judicial clarification of
the often indeterminate procedural rules and the substantive treaty standards in
international investment law in the judicial settlement of transnational economic
disputes with due regard to obligations of governments to protect human rights
vis-A-vis third parties adversely affected by investment disputes? More than 2,300
years ago, Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, discussed a variety of conceptions
of conventional justice in terms of rule-following; distributional justice in terms of
equal treatment and fairness in distribution; corrective justice; reciprocal justice;
and political justice ("the rule of reason" rather than "the rule of man" as "guard-
ian of equality and fairness" among "men who are free and equal" and "whose
mutual relationship is regulated by law"). 22 Aristotle emphasized that "the judge
restores equality" and judges are of particular importance for "equitable justice"
in terms of a rectification of law where law falls short by reason of its universali-
ty.23 Modern theories of justice tend to focus on the equal rights and obligations of
citizens and peoples rather than on the judicial function of administering justice.
Yet, as rational individuals and governments often pursue diverse conceptions of
the good life and social justice, principles of national and international justice are
20. See e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 115 (2006); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multi-
level Trade Governance Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 5 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds.,
2006) ; Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio Dellavalle, Universalism and Particularism as Paradigms ofIn-
ternational Law (Inst. for Int'l Law & Justice, Working Paper 2008/3), available at http://www.iilj
.org/publications/documents/2008-3.Bogdandy-Dellavalle.pdf.
21. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
22. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Oswald trans., 1999).
23. Id. at 122, 142.
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in dispute. Hence, national and international courts of justice and intergovern-
mental negotiations tend to focus on rules and often deliberately avoid clarifying
their underlying principles of justice.
The Vienna Convention was drafted at a time when human rights remained
deeply contested and suppressed in many states; consequently, the diplomats ne-
gotiating the Vienna Convention focused on international treaties among states
and their synallagmatic interrelationships of rights and duties among states. Al-
though drafted as a general treaty applicable to all international treaty relation-
ships among states, the Vienna Convention "contains many hidden assumptions
that are not justified in respect of human rights treaties24 and neither adequately
reflects the constitutional functions of human rights treaties nor the internation-
alization of national constitutions and the constitutionalization of international
law.25 The Vienna Convention's codification of the customary law requirement of
settling "disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes,.. . in con-
formity with the principles of justice and international law," including "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,"26
recalls the constitutional functions of courts to interpret and apply international
law in conformity with principles of justice and erga omnes human rights obliga-
tions. According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), "the Court's
obligation is to have regard to the special character of the Convention as a consti-
tutional instrument of European public order for the protection of individual
human beings and its role, as set out in Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure
the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties."27
Similarly, the ECJ, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Court, and various
investor-state tribunals emphasize their judicial function of protecting the rule of
international law with due regard for the rights of producers, investors, traders,
consumers, as well as other citizens against arbitrary interferences by govern-
ments and other abuses of public and private power. Just as the idea of rule of law
24. Martin Scheinin, Impact on the Law of Treaties, in THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (Menno T. Kamminga & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009).
25. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Markets and Economic Welfare: Constitutional
Functions of the Emerging UN Human Rights Constitution, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 29-67 (Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2006).
26. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
27. Bankovig and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, App. no. 52207/00, 2001-
XII E.H.R.R. 65.
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has always been related to justice," human rights instruments likewise emphasize
"that human rights should be protected by the rule of law."29 The focus on rule of
international law, legal security, legal remedies, and judicial protection of the in-
dividual rights of private economic actors has become a defining element of mod-
ern international economic law.
The functional interrelationships between law, judges, and justice are re-
flected in legal language from antiquity (for example, in the common core of the
Latin terms jus, judex, justitia) up to modern times (such as in the Anglo-Ameri-
can legal traditions of speaking of courts of justice and giving judges the title of
Mr. Justice, Lord Justice, or Chief Justice). As explained by John Rawls, in view of
"reasonable pluralism" and "the fact that in a democratic regime political power is
regarded as the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body," democratic
and judicial exercise of coercive power over citizens is democratically legitimate
only when "political power... is exercised in accordance with a constitution
(written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and ratio-
nal, can endorse in the light of their common human reason."3 As constitutions,
legislation, and international agreements can regulate dynamically changing eco-
nomic and social relations only in incomplete ways, judicial interpretation and
application of incomplete and often indeterminate rules inevitably entail filling in
the gaps and clarifying the contested meaning of general rules. Judicial concep-
tions of rule of law-not only in terms of legal restraints on power but also in
terms of a stable legal order for society that enables its constitutionally limited self-
governance31'-are inevitably influenced by judicial conceptions of principles of
justice. Rawls infers from his theory of justice that "in a constitutional regime
with judicial review, public reason is the reason of its supreme court."32 That rea-
son is critical for the overlapping, constitutional consensus necessary for a stable
and just society among free, equal, and rational citizens who tend to be deeply
divided by conflicting moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines.33 Just as all
28. See CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 8-12,
191-99 (1958) (discussing the ancient Greek concept of "law as participation in the idea of justice,"
and the need to relate justice to the value of equality).
29. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Ist
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
30. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS 41 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
31. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001) (dis-
cussing the democratic functions of judicial protection of constitutional rights).
32. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231 (1993).
33. Id. at 158.
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constitutional theories of justice and adjudication remain contextually and demo-
cratically contested, so also the Rawlsian theory of justice as constitutional impar-
tiality, reasonableness, and judicial protection of individual rights and rule of law
remains controversial, especially in view of Rawls' inadequate proposals for an
international "Law of Peoples.
34
The constitutional protection of access to justice and the EC guarantees of
independent courts administering justice impartially, subject to due process of
law, are positive law examples of constitutional justice as multilevel judicial pro-
tection of fundamental rights and of rule of law inside European integration. In
the exercise of their constitutional mandate to ensure respect for rule of law in the
interpretation and application of EC law, 35 the EC courts and national courts co-
operate in the judicial clarification and defense of the core constitutional princi-
ples of EC law, such as direct effect, supremacy, direct applicability by citizens,
implied powers, and European judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Similarly, the
different principles of indirect effect and indirect supremacy of precise and un-
conditional EEA rules were clarified and justified by the EFTA Court in coop-
eration with national courts in EEA countries.3 6 Other international courts
increasingly emphasize the inherent powers of courts of justice to ensure due pro-
cess of law, to prevent abuses of judicial procedures, to stay proceedings, to correct
any injustice caused by an earlier order, to determine the scope of their jurisdic-
tion, and to award remedies necessary for the performance of their judicial func-
tion.37 Courts with compulsory jurisdiction may legitimately assert functions
beyond the settlement of concrete disputes, such as the clarification and progres-
sive development of international law, as in ICJ advisory opinions, and of its sys-
temic relationships, as in what Article 3 of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding calls "the dispute settlement system of the WTO.'3
Economic courts-by interpreting and clarifying indeterminate investment
rules and incomplete treaty regulations with due regard to customary rules, gen-
34. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law, Human Rights and Theories oflustice,
in LAW IN THE SERVICE OF HUMAN DIGNITY 44,44-57 (Steve Charnovitz et al. eds., 2005) (criticiz-
ing Rawls' international theory of justice).
35. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 220, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 3.
36. See Petersmann,supra note 10.
37. See CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 55 (2007).
38. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1123 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop.e/dispu.e/dsu_e.htm#3.
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION
eral principles of law, judicial precedents, inherent powers of courts, and human
rights obligations of governments-may enable avoidance of conflicts among
fragmented jurisdictions, treaty regimes, conflicting governmental interpreta-
tions, and domestic implementing rules. Judicial clarification of an overlapping
consensus on a limited political conception of justice-as reflected in the core
guarantees of U.N. human rights law-can help justify, maintain, and adapt in-
ternational order endorsed by citizens and governments with competing world-
views, provided that the principles respect and protect basic human rights and
remain compatible with the enduring reality of diverse and partially conflicting
moral, religious, and other worldviews. Due to the frequent lack of explicit inter-
national law rules on the coordination of competing and overlapping jurisdic-
tions, judicial comity and conditional solange-cooperation among national and
international courts, as long as courts mutually respect the basic constitutional
principles of their limited jurisdictions-may offer the most effective, second-best
approach for multilevel judicial protection of rule of law and transformative jus-
tice in international cooperation among citizens. Occasional inconsistencies
among investor-state arbitral awards confirm that the increasing number of na-
tional and international tribunals, without appellate review or other effective hi-
erarchical rules, make uniformity of judicial decisions impossible.39 Furthermore,
the inevitable legal and judicial fragmentation of BITs and related investment
disputes may also promote collective learning processes that might gradually
prompt governments and courts to overcome conflicting regulatory and judicial
approaches to investment rules and related disputes.
III. Is THERE A ROLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT?
International law at the beginning of the twenty-first century is characterized
by the legal obligations of all 192 U.N. member states to respect and protect human
rights,"° as well as by the ever more comprehensive, multilevel legal regulation and
judicial protection of rights of citizens in their transnational economic cooperation.
Human rights and investment law are both aimed at legal protection of individual
rights by means of legal and judicial restraints on government powers, such as pro-
39. See APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Karl P. Sauvant ed.,
2008) (discussing inconsistencies among BITs and related arbitration awards, and initiatives for
enhancing transparency, coherence, and appellate review in investor-state dispute settlement).
40. See Scheinin, supra note 24.
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hibitions on discrimination, substantive safeguards of individual freedoms and pri-
vate property rights, and judicial remedies at national and international levels,
thereby protecting individuals against abuses of power by compensating for the in-
ferior, subordinated legal status of private actors vis-A-vis governments in domestic
laws. International investment law remains unique by granting private foreign in-
vestors direct access to international arbitral tribunals, often without prior exhaus-
tion of local remedies, in order to challenge governmental restrictions on investor
rights and claim damages for governmental breaches of investment law. As the sub-
stantive and procedural guarantees of investor rights in international investment
treaties and investor-state concession contracts tend to go beyond those provided by
human rights law, investors and host states only rarely invoke human rights in in-
vestment disputes.4! ' Investor-state arbitral tribunals remain reluctant to examine
human rights arguments on their own initiative or if raised in amicus curiae sub-
missions, unless human rights have also been argued by the parties. Hence, even
though the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has urged U.N. member
states to adopt a "human rights approach" to the interpretation and application of
international trade and investment law,42 investor-state arbitration awards have so
far contributed little to reducing the fragmentation in the development of human
rights law and international investment law.
Investor-state arbitration may be based either on commercial contracts and
privately agreed arbitration rules (such as those of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Court of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and the London Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration), or on international treaties (such as BITs and the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)), and legislation.
The respective procedures, applicable law, publicity, and international legal ef-
fects of private commercial arbitration concerning contract claims may differ fun-
damentally from those concerning treaty claims.43 As investor-state arbitrations
tend to involve not only private business interests but also the public policies of the
host state and rights of workers, consumers, and taxpayers affected by foreign in-
41. See Howard Mann, International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights (Global
Forum on Int'l Investment 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/50/40311282.pdf (pro-
viding examples of investment treaties and investor-state arbitral awards referring to human rights).
42. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on Promotion & Protection of Human Rights,
Human Rights, Trade and Investment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9 (July 2, 2003).
43. See Bernardo M. Cremades & David 1. A. Cairns, Contract and Treaty Claims and Choices of
Forum in Foreign Investment Disputes, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTEs 325 (Nor-
bert Horn ed., 2004) (discussing these important differences).
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vestments, the commercial arbitration paradigms of private party autonomy and
confidentiality among private parties may not be appropriate for investor-state ar-
bitration. Arbitral awards on investor-state disputes risk lacking credibility and
democratic acceptability if they disregard legitimate interests of adversely affected
third parties or overrule, in non-transparent proceedings, democratically legiti-
mate government decisions on grounds of investor-state contracts.44
Most international investment disputes and investor-state arbitrations relate to
legal claims based on investment contracts and international investment treaties that
include choice of law clauses and jurisdictional clauses referring, directly or indi-
rectly, to the domestic law of the host state and to "such rules of international law as
may be applicable." 5 The sovereign freedom of states to regulate their domestic
economy and investment regime, the diversity of national legal and democratic tra-
ditions, and the private autonomy of investors and legal protection of their property
rights inevitably entail that national investment laws, the more than 2,500 BITs con-
cluded among states, and related arbitration awards differ among countries and ju-
risdictions. Yet, notwithstanding the lack of a coherent international judicial system
and of formal legal obligations among ad hoc arbitral tribunals or competing arbi-
tral institutions, the ever increasing number of investment-related national and in-
ternational court judgments, arbitral awards, and other dispute settlement reports
continue to identify and to clarify common principles underlying the procedural
law of international dispute settlement bodies.46 They also promote mutually consis-
tent interpretations of internationally agreed-upon substantive standards of legal
protection, regulation, expropriation, and dispute settlement.47
This judicial harmonization is facilitated by contextual, systematic, dynamic,
and effective interpretations of investment law in conformity with applicable non-
investment law. International investment agreements often explicitly state that
tribunals should consider international law as applicable.48 This is unlike the nar-
44. See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); DAVID ScH-
NEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRA-
CY'S PROMISE (2008).
45. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, art. 42, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
46. See BROWN, SUpra note 37.
47. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
19-20 (2008).
48. On the contested question of whether international law plays only a "complementary role"
vis-a-vis domestic investment law (e.g. in order to fill a "lacuna" in domestic law) or also a "correc-
tive role" vis-A-vis domestic rules that are inconsistent with international law, see Emmanuel Gail-
lard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of "and" in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of the Washington
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 16:2
rower applicable law clauses in Articles 7 and 17 of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding. For example, an increasing number of investor-state arbitral
awards examine claims of whether investment rules should be construed in con-
formity with the pertinent WTO obligations of the state concerned.49 The dy-
namically evolving case law of private commercial arbitration, national and
international courts, investor-state arbitration based on international investment
treaties, and alternative dispute settlement proceedings suggests that-despite the
lack of a centralized structure of international law and of an integrated judicial
system coordinating competing and often overlapping jurisdictions-courts in-
creasingly employ the customary methods of systematic treaty interpretation, gen-
eral principles of law and constitutional interpretation for resolving investment
disputes by interpreting investment contracts and investment treaties within their
broader context of national and international law.
IV. Is CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE ALSO AN APPROPRIATE PARADIGM FOR
COMMERCIAL INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION?
The procedural similarities between international commercial arbitration re-
garding contract claims and investor-state arbitration regarding treaty claims ob-
fuscate important legal differences. Commercial arbitration is based on private
consent to arbitrate, rather than on public law arbitration without privity. Fur-
thermore, commercial arbitration focuses on alleged breaches of an international
commercial contract or a related non-contractual dispute rather than on govern-
mental breaches of international law obligations vis-A-vis foreign investors. Invest-
Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18 FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT L.J. 375,399 (2003). See also Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, SCC No. 088/2004 (Arb. Inst.
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 2007) ("This does not mean that international law applies only
when it is in conflict with national law. On the contrary, it means that international law generally
applies. It is not just a gap-filling law. It is only where international law is silent that the Arbitral
Tribunal should consider before reaching any decision how non conflicting [sic] provisions of
Czech law might be relevant, and if so, could be taken into account.").
49. See, e.g., Pope and Talbot v. Canada, 7 ICSID Reps. 102,111 (2001). In July 2001, the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission issued legally binding "Notes of Interpretation of Certain NAFTA Chapter
11 Provisions" stating, inter alia, that-contrary to previous interpretations by NAFTA tribunals-
the "fair and equitable treatment standard" must be understood only as a reference to the customary
international "minimum standard of treatment." The new Article 6(5) in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT
on expropriation and compensation clarifies explicitly that "[tlhis Article does not apply to the issu-
ance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the
TRIPS Agreement." U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 Model BIT, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeSectors/Investment/ModelBIT/asset-upload-file847_6897.pdf.
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ment treaties, however, more frequently insist on an amicable negotiation period
as a procedural requirement prior to arbitration.
While a commercial arbitral tribunal usually "appl[ies] the rules of law which
it determines to be appropriate,"" public law investment arbitration tends to pro-
vide that the "tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law
as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute and such rules of
international law as may be applicable. 51 Investment treaties often include um-
brella clauses that further elevate breaches of investor-state contracts to breaches of
BITs. Compared with concession contracts concluded by a state jure gestionis (yet
without prejudice to state immunity from execution), these investment treaties
are acta jure imperii with evident public law and public interest dimensions.
In contrast to the increasing publicity of investment arbitration, confidentiality
and privacy of hearings continue to be respected in commercial arbitration. While
commercial arbitration awards remain confidential absent express consent or chal-
lenges in national courts, public investment arbitration procedures and awards are
increasingly published and contribute to the creation of legal precedents. Although
the lex arbitri may be important in commercial arbitration for obtaining evidence
and for support or annulment by national courts, investment arbitration instantiates
a self-contained regime without reference to local courts. Finally, the international
legal obligation to enforce commercial awards pursuant to Article III of the New
York Convention is subject to limited judicial review by domestic courts; awards
rendered pursuant to ICSID procedures must be executed without further analysis
by the domestic judiciary and are only subject to ICSID annulment proceedings. 2
The commercial law principles of party autonomy, contractual freedom,
agreed-upon mediation, and confidential arbitration reflect principles of contrac-
tual justice. Private arbitrators have a demonstrable self-interest in interpreting
their mandate as being limited to dispute settlement for the benefit of their clients,
as well as in avoiding human rights arguments that were not raised by the parties.
Privately agreed arbitration, however, entails duties to act "judicially" by protect-
ing a fair trial and due process of law and having respect for public order and jus
cogens norms. In some jurisdictions there is no opportunity for concurrent court
50. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 17 (2003), available at http://
www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf documents/rules/rules-arb-english.pdf
51. ICSID Convention, supra note 45, art. 42.
52. See Nigel Blackaby, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (or the Tale of the Dol-
phin and the Shark), in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 217 (Loukas A. Mistelis
& Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006) (discussing these differences).
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control; consequently, the aggrieved party must wait for the end of the proceed-
ings before she may challenge the award.13 The state consent to investor-state dis-
putes tends to be part of public law instruments, which, in turn, recognize that
investor-state disputes, even if they involve contract claims rather than treaty
claims, often affect public interests. The public law dimensions of investor-state
disputes are also reflected in many other features of investor-state arbitration. For
example, they may function to replace litigation in domestic courts and diplo-
matic protection, to offer remedies against violations of international law, or to
facilitate the increasing admission of amici curiae submissions to arbitral tribunals
or the subsequent judicial review of arbitral awards in the process of their recog-
nition and enforcement in foreign countries.
The famous 1958 Liith decision by the German Constitutional Court concern-
ing a private boycott against a film produced by a former Nazi film director also il-
lustrates the potential relevance of constitutional law and human rights for the
interpretation and judicial protection of private law. 4 The ECJ likewise considers
respect for fundamental economic freedoms and labor rights in relations among
private actors, just as the ECtHR emphasizes the objective constitutional order es-
tablished by the European Convention on Human Rights. The mere fact that com-
mercial investor-state arbitration is grounded in mutual agreement does not
effectively preclude concession contracts from remaining subject to constitutional
law, regulatory state powers, and human rights. The case law of the European
53. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 5-20 (3d ed. 1999).
54. The Court inferred from Article 1(3) of the German Basic Law that fundamental constitu-
tional rights (such as the general personality right and freedom of expression protected by Articles
2 and 5 of the Basic Law), apart from granting individual rights, also prescribe objective constitu-
tional values that apply to the whole legal order and must be taken into account in judicial inter-
pretation of general private law clauses. BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958), translated in Univ. of Texas Foreign
Law Translations (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/
work-new/german/case.php?id = 1369; see Hannes Rosier, Harmonizing the German Civil Code of
the Nineteenth Century with a Modern Constitution, 23 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 1 (2008).
55. See ALEKSANDER JAKsiC, ARBITRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). Jaksic emphasizes that
"State Parties to the human rights treaties undertake to create an objective legal order." Id. at 85. "The
violation of the European public order gives rise to a duty to deny the recognition of any legal act
which is performed in contravention of such an order." Id. at 87. "Human rights norms are applicable
to voluntary arbitration procedure and to any proceedings which are capable of affecting the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the human rights instruments." Id. at 215. "Parties cannot and are not
supposed therefore to waive the irreducible core of procedural guarantees, such as the right to an in-
dependent and impartial court, the right to a fair trial and the due process of law which are sine qua
non for liberty, dignity, justice and.., the rule of law principle." Id. at 218.
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courts, just as the explicit recognition in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
that European fundamental rights "entail responsibilities and duties with regard to
other persons, to the human community and to future generations," illustrates that
"principles of justice" and other constitutional restraints in international law may
also affect and constitutionally limit private and commercial law practices, includ-
ing investor-state arbitration based on BITs concluded among EU member states.56
V. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL BALANCING IN THE PROTECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
The equal procedural status of private and state parties in investor-state arbitra-
tion and the development of the customary international law prohibition of "denial
of justice"57 into the human right of access to justice58 and judicial protection of
human rights reflect the increasing recognition of citizens as legal subjects and dem-
ocratic owners of international law. Can the human rights obligations of governments
justify judicial clarification of the often indeterminate BIT standards of protection in
conformity with intergovernmental obligations to protect individual rights in BITs,
U.N. conventions, World Intellectual Property Organization conventions, Interna-
tional Labor Organization conventions, WTO rules, and individual judicial reme-
dies, subject to legitimate public interest regulation? To what extent does the
exponential growth of investor-state arbitration and related human rights jurispru-
dence59 provide evidence of the emergence of new customary international law?
International investments have become crucially important for job opportuni-
ties and the welfare of a plethora of people in numerous countries. Yet, as illustrated
by under-regulation and the 2008 worldwide crisis in transnational banking ser-
vices, the private, local, national, regional, and worldwide regulation of transna-
tional investments often remains incomplete, especially with regard to the potentially
conflicting investor, shareholder, and management interests, worker interests, gen-
eral citizen interests, and bureaucratic self-interests. Democratic governance re-
56. See Christer Siderlund, Intra-EU BIT Investment Protection and the EC Treaty, 24 J. INT'L ARB.
455 (2007).
57. See JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 36 (2005) (discussing the cus-
tomary law requirement to provide decent justice to foreigners and "to create and maintain a system
of justice which ensures that unfairness to foreigners either does not happen, or is corrected").
58. See AccESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007).
59. See Ursula Kriebaum, Privatizing Human Rights: The Interface between International Invest-
ment Protection and Human Rights, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 165 (August Reinisch
& Ursula Kriebaum eds., 2007).
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quires not only the transparent discussion and fair balancing of the aforementioned
diverse interests of investors, workers, consumers, citizens, and diverse national,
transnational, and intergovernmental actors. Constitutional democracy also calls for
legal and judicial protection of the constitutional rights of investors, workers, con-
sumers and other citizens, as well as of the legitimate scope of local, national, re-
gional, and worldwide rules and governance institutions. The multilevel regulation
of international trade, investments, and dispute settlement illustrates the need for
multilevel constitutional safeguards of individual rights against abuses of public and
private power at national, transnational, and international levels.6"
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle concluded that "we must postpone until
later an examination of the various kinds of acts of justice and of injustice."' Un-
fortunately, his promise was not fulfilled in any of his extant writings. In Europe,
the overlapping consensus among national and European courts on the need for
judicial protection of constitutional justice has successfully transformed the inter-
governmental EC treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights into
constitutional orders founded on respect for human rights and mutually benefi-
cial cooperation among citizens.62 Their judicial constitutionalization of intergov-
ernmental treaty regimes was accepted by citizens, national courts, parliaments,
and governments because the judicial "European public reason" protected indi-
vidual rights and European public goods (like the EC's common market) more
effectively than state-centric interpretations focusing on discretionary government
powers without adequate legal and judicial remedies for citizens. Yet, constitu-
tional interpretations of intergovernmental agreements for the benefit of the rights
of citizens remain deeply controversial outside the rights-based European eco-
nomic law,63 just as the conception of investment treaty arbitration as commercial
arbitration, or the "internationalization" of investor-state contracts by means of
international arbitration and umbrella clauses that transform contract claims into
treaty claims, remains legally and politically contested. By taking their judicial
mandate of settling disputes in conformity with principles of justice and interna-
tional law more seriously, national and international courts can contribute to the
clarification and strengthening of the legitimacy of international law in the
twenty-first century and to its constitutional foundation on principles of justice.
60. See generally Petersmann, supra note 20.
61. ARISTOTLE,supra note 22, at 133.
62. See Petersmann,supra note 10 (discussing the legitimately diverse "constitutional interpreta-
tions" of economic law by the ECJ, the EFTA Court and the ECtHR).
63. See, e.g., VAN HARTEN, supra note 44, at 136 (criticizing the likening of the investor rights ap-
proach to legal and judicial remedies under human rights law);see also Petersmann,supra note 10.
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Whereas some investor-state tribunals identify the primary objective of BITs as
international legal and judicial protection of investor rights to compensate for the
weaker legal status of aliens in host states,' others reject one-sided interpretations in
favor of foreign investors by emphasizing that the treaty objectives of promoting
economic development "utilize investor protection as a means to an end;"' the in-
creasing number of explicit BIT exceptions reserving state rights to protect non-
economic public interests confirms the need for "a balanced interpretation ... taking
into account both State sovereignty and the State's responsibility to create an adapted
and evolutionary framework for the development of economic activities, and the
necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow."6 6 The successful
cooperation among national and international courts in European integration sug-
gests that judicial recourse to general principles of law, such as respect for human
rights, limited delegation of powers, non-discrimination, and necessity and propor-
tionality of government restrictions of individual rights, offers legal criteria for judi-
cial balancing of public and private interests and for coordinating competing
jurisdictions and judicial review standards in international investment disputes,
thereby complementing judicial recourse to conflict of law and private law princi-
ples, such as judicial comity, res judicata, and litis pendens. The successive agree-
ments among NAFTA member states to limit the NAFTA jurisprudence regarding
the NAFTA minimum standard of treatment and expropriation standard,67 like
the recent case law of the ECJ limiting the legal liability of EC institutions for dam-
ages caused by EC violations of WTO law,68 illustrate that, in constitutional democ-
racies as well as in European integration law, state liability for public interest
regulation of the economy must remain limited. Moreover, the legal clarification of
the general investment protection standards by the judiciary always remains subject
64. See, e.g., Siemens AG v. Republic of Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/8, 81 (Aug. 3, 2004): "The Tribunal shall be guided by the purpose of the Treaty as ex-
pressed in its title and preamble. It is a treaty 'to protect' and 'to promote' investments.... The inten-
tion of the parties is clear. It is to create favorable conditions for investments and to stimulate private
initiative;" SGS Socit G~nrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, 116 (Jan. 29, 2004): "It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so
as to favour the protection of covered investments."
65. VAN HARTEN, supra note 44, at 140 ("The preambular language of investment treaties does not
provide a basis for adopting a presumption in favour of safeguarding the claimant against the state.").
66. El Paso Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case. No. ARB/03/15, 70 (Apr. 27,
2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/elpaso-jurisdiction27april2006.pdf.
67. See Pope and Talbot, supra note 49, at 111; VAN HARTEN, supra note 44, at 145-46.
68. See Joined Cases C-120/06 P & C-121/06 P, FIAMM & Fedion v. Council & Commn, 108,
2008 E.C.R. 00 (E.C.J. Sept. 9, 2008),available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=CELEX:62006J0120:EN:HTML.
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to democratic rule-making. Both state-centric conceptions of international judges as
agents of states with mandates limited by public international law, as well as private
law conceptions of commercial arbitrators settling private disputes on the basis of
private contracts, must remain consistent with the judicial task of interpreting law
and settling disputes in conformity with principles of justice.
Therefore, investor-state arbitrations involving conflicts among private and pub-
lic interests require reconciling the private and public law dimensions within a public
law framework that must avoid one-sided preferential treatment of investor rights.
The ECJ, the EFTA Court, the ECtHR, and national courts throughout Europe
have also demonstrated the need for judicial respect for the reality of constitutional
pluralism; their judicial review of governmental interferences into economic free-
doms and other fundamental rights correctly emphasizes that judicial interpretation,
application and balancing of rights on the basis of constitutional principles must take
into account the human rights obligations of the governments concerned.
One reason for the disregard by investor-state arbitral tribunals and intergov-
ernmental dispute settlement bodies of the customary law requirement of settling
international disputes in conformity with principles of justice and human rights is
the lack of adequate constitutional checks and balances. An example of this is the
self-interests of governments in limiting their legal and judicial accountability for
the welfare-reducing effects of discriminatory restrictions of transnational trade
and investments. The principles of commutative justice, contractual justice, and
conventional justice underlying private commercial arbitration differ fundamen-
tally from, and need to be reconciled with, the principles of constitutional justice
limiting governments and public national and international courts. The judicial
task of settling disputes with due regard to the constitutional rights of citizens
and constitutional restraints of governance powers is essential for maintaining an
overlapping consensus on principles of justice among states and citizens with
competing self-interests and conflicting conceptions of the good life, social justice,
and an efficient regulation of the economy.
Even though human rights arguments have hardly ever been raised in General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO dispute settlement proceed-
ings and were examined by the ECJ in only a very select number of cases among the
thousands of ECJ judgments, they may be important parts of the relevant context
and democratic legitimacy of judicial settlements of investment disputes with due
regard to all parties concerned, including third-party citizens whose interests are
adversely affected. As many WTO members (including the United States) have
ratified neither regional human rights conventions nor the U.N. Covenant on Eco-
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nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the human rights dimensions of economic
freedoms and of related general exceptions are likely always to remain controversial,
there are also good reasons for judicial self-restraint and judicial deference vis-A-vis
the long-standing GATT and WTO practice of invoking and interpreting the
broad public interest exceptions in GATT/WTO law without raising human rights
arguments in GATT/WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The clarification of
principles of justice, initiated by Aristotle more than 2,300 years ago, continues to
remain a never-ending challenge for lawyers, scholars, judges, and other citizens in
their common and ongoing pursuit of more effective guarantees of constitutional
justice in national, as well as in international, relations.
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